

AFRICAN UNION

Special Session of the Peace and Security Council

Agenda 1: Curbing the rise of terrorism and militant groups including Boko Haram and Al Shabaab

Agenda 2: Addressing the security of populations affected by instability in Central and Northern Africa



Chairperson's Address

Delegates, welcome to CISMUN 2019, and to this session of the African Union Peace and Security Council! With several conflicts raging in the country, the most recent being the uprisings in Sudan, there is a lot that this committee can discuss and deliberate upon. Considering the important role played by some non members of the Peace and Security Council and the African Union in the region, delegates from these countries will also be present in this special session of the AU PSC.

As a chairperson, I expect adherence to foreign policy and good research from each delegate. Mentioning relevant points in speeches is important, but substantiating them with solid arguments is more important. Use of logic and quick thinking will also be a skill tested when flow of debate slows down and updates are introduced.

The best way to do well is to be involved in the committee. In this committee, if at any point you feel that you are idle, there is something you're missing. The delegates who take part in all the aspects of committee, from speeches to questions to lobbying, are ultimately the ones who do well.

If you are a first timer or new to MUNs, the best advice I can give you is, don't hesitate to speak. Getting intimidated by the more experienced delegates is normal, but having the courage to get up and say your point out loud is what matters and it is the only way in which you can become better. I can guarantee you that I, or any other delegate who you think is doing well, was in your position one day.

Last but not the least, I hope all of you have a great time in this committee and enjoy the CISMUN experience. Please feel free to contact me for any queries or questions.

Shreshth Sarda

Chairperson, African Union

Co Secretary General, CISMUN 2019



Meet the Executive Board

The Chairperson, **Shreshth Sarda**, studies in the 12th grade. He is currently studying science in A Levels. A cricket fan, he'll be happy to have a conversation with you about the ongoing ICC World Cup. He also likes to take part in all school activities, from drama to inter-house sports events. He loves the Harry Potter series (books, not the movies) and is also a fan of the TV show FRIENDS. Shreshth has attended several MUN conferences, which have helped him broaden his perspective of the world.

The vice chairperson, **Harsh Kumbhat**, is a student in the 11th grade. A fan of Aziz Ansari, Harsh loves watching stand up comedies and usually spends his weekend bingeing them. He reads religiously and aspires to become a writer in the near future (following his brother's footsteps?). President of the CIS Nature Club and his environmental NGO, StopWatch, his other interests include protecting the environment, and fighting anyone who tries to harm it. If you have any comments about his height, he'll definitely have a word or two to give back ;)

The director of this committee, **Veda Jain** is and is relatively new to the MUNing circuit, but that doesn't stop her from using wit and logic to give powerful statements. She loves to read and binge watch shows. She truly believes Africa deserves more attention from the world and hence is excited for this session of the AU.



MANDATE

FUNCTIONS

The Peace and Security Council shall perform functions in the following areas:

a. promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;

b. early warning and preventive diplomacy;


c. peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry;

d. peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;

e. peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;

f. humanitarian action and disaster management;

g. any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.



Agenda 1 :Curbing the rise of terrorism and militant groups including Boko Haram and Al Shabaab



AL SHABAAB

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

September 21 – 24, 2013 Terror in Nairobi

In a multiday raid on a Nairobi mall, al-Shabab militants kill sixty-seven people. It is the deadliest terrorist attack in Kenya in fifteen years.

December, 2013 U.S. Deploys Ground Troops

The U.S. military sends a small team of advisors to Mogadishu to assist AMISOM forces. It is the first U.S. deployment since eighteen soldiers were killed in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.

September 1, 2014 Al-Shabab Leader Killed

Ahmed Umar, also known as Abu Ubaidah, becomes al-Shabab's leader after Ahmed Abdi Godane, one of the group's founders, is killed in a U.S. air strike.

April 2, 2015 Kenya Again Under Attack

Al-Shabab militants in central Kenya kill 148 people at Garissa University College. The fifteen-hour siege, in which gunmen hold more than seven hundred students hostage, exceeds the 2013 mall raid as the group's deadliest attack in the country.

February 8, 2017 A Contentious Election

Former Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed wins the presidency. The government hails the election as the final step in its decades-long path toward effective central governance, but international observers criticize the election as corrupt.

October 15, 2017 Mogadishu Bombings

In Somalia's deadliest terrorist attack, truck bombings in the capital city kill more than five hundred people and injure another three hundred. Al-Shabab is widely believed to be behind the attack, though it does not claim responsibility. Two weeks later, Shabab militants kill at least twenty-nine during a siege on a hotel in Mogadishu; the dead include senior government and police officials.

November 21, 2017 U.S. Escalates Strikes

More than one hundred militants affiliated with al-Shabab are killed in a single U.S. air strike northwest of Mogadishu, according to the Pentagon. The strike is one of more than two dozen in Somalia authorized by the Trump administration in its first year.

September 30, 2017 AMISOM Begins Drawdown

The UN Security Council approves the withdrawal of a thousand AMISOM troops by the end of 2017, the first time it has cut peacekeeper numbers in Somalia, as part of a transition of security



responsibilities to the Somali government. In July 2018, it votes to delay further reductions until 2019.

January 15, 2019 Attack on Kenya Hotel

Al-Shabab claims responsibility for a deadly siege at a Nairobi luxury hotel complex. At least fourteen people are killed and hundreds of civilians trapped amid an hours-long standoff between gunmen and security forces.

June 16, 2019 Car Bombings

Twin car bombings have killed at least eight people in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, emergency workers have said, as the al-Shabab armed group claimed responsibility for the attacks. Dozens of people were injured when a car bomb was detonated near the parliament headquarters in Mogadishu.

Introduction

Al-Shabab, or “the Youth,” is an Islamist insurgent group based in Somalia. It once held sway over the capital of Mogadishu and large portions of the Somali countryside, but in recent years an African Union–led military campaign has pushed it back from major population centers. However, the thousands-strong insurgency remains the principal security challenge in war-torn Somalia. It mounted its deadliest attack yet in late 2017.

History of al-Shabab

One of the most impoverished countries in the world, Somalia has seen militant groups come and go in its decades of political upheaval. Analysts say the forerunner of al-Shabab, and the incubator for many of its leaders, was al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”), a militant Salafi group that peaked in the 1990s, after the fall of Said Barre’s 1969–1991 regime and the outbreak of civil war. AIAI’s core was a band of Middle East–educated Somali extremists that was partly funded and armed by al-Qaeda’s chief, Osama bin Laden.

In the early 2000s, a rift developed between AIAI’s old guard, which had decided to create a political front, and younger members, who sought the establishment of a “Greater Somalia” under fundamentalist Islamic rule. The hard-liners eventually joined forces with an alliance of sharia courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and served as its youth militia. Al-Shabab and the ICU wrested control of the capital in June 2006, a victory that stoked fears in neighboring Ethiopia of spillover jihadi violence.

Radicalization of Al Shabab

Ethiopia, a majority-Christian nation, invaded Somalia in December 2006 and ousted the ICU from Mogadishu with little resistance. The intervention, which came at the request of Somalia’s transitional government, radicalized al-Shabab, analysts say. After much of the ICU fled to neighboring countries, al-Shabab retreated to the south, where it began organizing guerrilla assaults, including bombings and assassinations, on Ethiopian forces. Some experts say it was



during these years that the group morphed into a full-fledged insurgency, gaining control over large pieces of territory in central and southern Somalia.

Transformation of the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country began after the Ethiopian intervention. Addis Ababa said the intervention was a “reluctant response” to calls by the ICU for jihad against Ethiopia and its renewed territorial claims against both Ethiopia and Kenya. It has stressed that the intervention was supported by the United States and the African Union, among others.

New Islamist-nationalist fighters swelled al-Shabab's ranks from around four hundred into the thousands between 2006 and 2008. The group's ties to al-Qaeda emerged during this period. Al-Shabab leaders praised the terrorist network and condemned what they characterized as U.S. crimes against Muslims worldwide. The US State Department designated al-Shabab a foreign terrorist organization in February 2008. Al-Shabab's leadership declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012.

Objectives and Ideology

Al-Shabab as a whole continues to pursue its broad aim of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. Bronwyn Bruton, an expert on al-Shabab at the Atlantic Council, says hard-liners within the group have gained prominence in recent years. “People who are still calling themselves al-Shabab are more and more committed to the idea of sharia law,” she says. “The unifying idea of al-Shabab is opposition to the Western-backed government.”

In areas it controls, al-Shabab enforces its own harsh interpretation of sharia, prohibiting various types of entertainment, such as movies and music; the sale of khat, a narcotic plant that is often chewed; smoking; and the shaving of beards. Stonings and amputations have been meted out to suspected adulterers and thieves. The group bans cooperation with humanitarian agencies, blocking aid deliveries as famine loomed in 2017. This forced some eight hundred thousand to flee their homes, according to the United Nations.

Funding of Al Shabab

Counterterrorism experts say al-Shabab has benefited from several sources of income over the years, including other terrorist groups, piracy, kidnapping, and extortion of local businesses, farmers, and aid groups, among others. The Eritrean government has in the past been accused of financing the group, but it denied these claims.

Al-Shabab has built up an extensive racketeering operation, with checkpoint taxation on illicitly traded charcoal bringing in upward of \$7.5 million per year despite a UN ban on Somali charcoal exports in place since 2012. In recent years, al-Shabab has increased its reliance on smuggling contraband sugar across the border into Kenya, bringing in tens of millions of dollars annually. Kenyan forces have been accused of involvement in the scheme since 2015.



AMISOM

The UN Security Council authorized the African Union to lead a peacekeeping force in Somalia, which is known by its acronym, AMISOM, in early 2007. Its primary mandate was to protect the country's transitional government, which was set up in 2004 but had just returned to power in Mogadishu. Uganda was the first nation to send forces into Somalia under AMISOM, and it maintains the largest contingent in the regional force, at more than six thousand troops. Other contributing countries also include Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti and Somalia. It also has a police force with personnel from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia.

AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. On 21 February 2007 the United Nations Security Council approved the mission's mandate. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorised by the United Nations Security Council.

Security Council Extended the Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia by unanimously adopting resolution 2472 (2019) on 31 May 2019.

United States Role

Washington's primary interest in Somalia has been preventing the country from becoming a refuge for terrorist groups to plot attacks on the United States and destabilize the Horn of Africa, where longstanding disputes among Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia fester.

The United States has largely relied on proxy forces in Somalia to fight al-Shabab, and has hired private contractors to supply some of them, according to the New York Times. Since 2007, Washington has provided hundreds of millions of dollars to train and equip AMISOM and Somali security forces, but it announced in late 2017 it was suspending aid to most Somali units over corruption concerns. In April of that year, President Donald J. Trump authorized the first deployment of regular U.S. troops to the country since 1994, joining a small number of counterterrorism advisors already there. Defense officials say some five hundred U.S. personnel are now stationed there.

U.S. air strikes in Somalia have spiked under the Trump administration. The United States carried out thirty-five strikes in 2017, compared with fourteen ordered by the Obama administration in 2016. A single strike on a training camp northwest of Mogadishu in November 2017 killed more than a hundred militants, according to U.S. Africa Command.

The United States recognized the Somali government in 2013 but did not reestablish a permanent diplomatic presence in Mogadishu until December 2018, nearly three decades after it had closed its embassy. In the years prior, U.S. diplomats had worked out of neighboring Kenya.



Kenya

For the past decade, Al Shabab has targeted marginalised communities along East Africa's Swahili coast who share historical ties through Islamic culture and ancient trade roots. The terror group also targets vulnerable unemployed young people in Kenya's underdeveloped North Eastern Province, which borders Somalia and is predominantly inhabited by the Somali community. The group has also exploited local grievances, attracting impoverished young people across faiths in Kenya who feel the government has failed them. Rampant corruption and a judicial crisis have fuelled the militant recruitments. For decades - even before 2013 when devolution came to effect - resource allocation was skewed which resulted in the marginalisation of some areas. An effect that is still being felt to date.

"The extremists are promising hefty pay for local fighters who have largely remained unemployed or poorly paid," a human rights campaigner, Khalifa said. "They target those below 30 years, Kenya's biggest population and one which has been greatly affected and impacted by unemployment."

Smuggling as a means of funding

Al Shabaab Drug Trafficking reports shows how the militant group is diversifying ways of soliciting funds to fund their terrorism activities in East Africa. It is suspected that Somali based Al Shabaab Mujahideen key leaders are engaging in drug-trafficking along the border to raise funds for terror activities. Some reports show a section of the key Al Shabaab leaders have special links with other traffickers, all operating on the Kenya maritime zone.

Kenya has apparently sealed a major Al Shabaab's financial sources in the country following the closure of suspicious Hawalas and bus companies. Drug trafficking and illegal elephant poaching in Kenya is could be the next activity bolstering Al-Shabaab in Somalia, contributing up to 40 percent of the gang's economic threshold. Al Shabaab militants are using whatever means they can to get easy money after Kenya starved off their trade routes and financial lifelines.

Ethiopia involvement

Ethiopia has contributed many troops to AMISOM and has contributed other troops to combat Al Shabab on requests of the Somali government.


The Ethiopian National Defence Force, ENDF, says its Air Force has bombarded bases of militant group Al-Shabaab in Somalia killing two leaders of the group in the process. A statement from the Ministry of Defense sent to the state broadcaster, EBC, confirmed the attacks that lasted about 45 minutes were carried out on January 24, 2019 in Bur Haybe, located 75km east of Baidoa, capital of the South West regional state. The report said aside the killing of Abdu Osman and Abdusalem – the group's operations chief and a grenade detonation expert, 35 Al Shabaab members were also killed.

Around January 18, 2019, Somali media outlets reported that Ethiopian troops serving under the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, had been ambushed in Baidoa and that casualties



had been reported. Subsequent reports indicated that the Ethiopian contingent were preparing an onslaught on Al-Shabaab. Security watchers believe the aerial attacks of January 24 could be the said response.

Countries where Al Shabab has been active since 2010



Boko Haram or Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA)

BOKO HARAM TIMELINE OF EVENTS



August 14, 2016 - Boko Haram releases a video of some of the girls kidnapped in April 2014 and demands the release of Boko Haram fighters in exchange for the girls.

October 13, 2016 - Boko Haram militants hand over 21 Chibok schoolgirls to authorities after a series of negotiations with the Nigerian government. It's the first mass release of any of the more than 200 girls and women kidnapped from their school in April 2014.

January 5, 2017 - The Nigerian army says a missing Chibok girl and her six-month old baby have been located during an operation to arrest suspected Boko Haram terrorists.

January 17, 2017 - Scores of people are killed when a Nigerian fighter jet mistakenly bombs a camp for the internally displaced during an operation in Rann against Boko Haram militants, according to Nigerian officials and the Red Cross. The Nigerian government provides no official death toll, but humanitarian aid group Doctors Without Borders says "about 90" people died.

May 6, 2017 - Eighty-two Chibok schoolgirls are released after negotiations between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government.

February 19, 2018 - A faction of Boko Haram raids the Government Girls Science and Technical College in the northeast Nigerian town of Dapchi, kidnapping 110 students of the college.

March 1, 2018 - Boko Haram militants attack a displacement camp in Rann, Borno State, killing at least three Nigerian aid workers and injuring three others. Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aid workers are abducted in the attack. On September 17, the ICRC says abducted aid worker Saifura Hussaini Ahmed Khorsa, 25, has been killed. Abducted midwife Hauwa Mohammed Liman is executed after a deadline for negotiations expires, the Nigerian government says on October 16.

March 21, 2018 - Minister of Information and Culture Alhaji Lai Mohammed says 104 of the girls abducted from their boarding school on February 19 have been released and returned to their hometown of Dapchi. Six of the Dapchi schoolgirls are still missing. Mohammed also later clarifies that two others who were kidnapped, "who are not students of the college -- a primary school boy who came to the school to sell pure water and another primary school girl," were released as well.

April 13, 2018 - UNICEF says Boko Haram has kidnapped more than 1,000 children in northeastern Nigeria since 2013.

May 7, 2018 - The Nigerian army says it has rescued more than 1,000 Boko Haram captives -- mainly women and children, as well as some young men who had been forced to become Boko Haram fighters -- in Borno state. The operation, which was conducted in conjunction with Cameroonian and Nigerian troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), rescued the hostages from Malamkari, Amchaka, Walasa and Gora villages of the Bama Local Government Area.



May 24, 2018 - Amnesty International releases a report claiming women and girls who have fled Boko Haram are being raped by Nigerian soldiers, starved and forced to exchange food for sex. The Nigerian government tells CNN the military found cases of abuse in these camps during the period mentioned in Amnesty's report in 2015 and meted out appropriate punishment, countering an army spokesman's claims that the allegations were investigated and found not to be true. Both the government and army spokesman accuse Amnesty of "recycling" claims from a previous report.

January 29, 2019 - The UN Refugee agency says escalating attacks by Boko Haram militants have forced 30,000 people out of Nigeria's northeast into Cameroonian borders over the weekend. The United Nations says more than 250,000 people have already been displaced from northeast Nigeria, and surging militant attacks targeting civilians have forced thousands more to run for their lives each day.

April 14, 2019 - On the fifth anniversary of the kidnapping of girls from Chibok, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari reiterates his promise that "we will not rest until all the remaining girls are back and reunited with their families."

May 16, 2019 - Attack near TongoTongo, Niger, killing more than twenty soldiers not far from the Malian border.

Introduction

The jihadist group known as Boko Haram began its bloody insurgency in northeastern Nigeria in 2009, but it has since spread into neighboring Niger, Chad and Cameroon, prompting a regional military response.

Since 2009, more than 27,000 people have been killed and two million others displaced, sparking a dire humanitarian crisis in the region. On April 30, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism Nathan A. Sales said that the U.S. assesses that Boko Haram and ISWAP "have been responsible for over 35,000 deaths since 2011."

Boko Haram split into two factions in mid-2016. One, led by long-time leader Abubakar Shekau, is notorious for suicide bombings and indiscriminate killings of civilians. Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in March 2015, but ISIS central only gives formal backing to the other faction, which it calls Islamic State West Africa Province.

The Multinational Joint Task Force, a regional counter-insurgency force comprising personnel from Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, launched Operation YancinTafki on February 21 to battle the insurgents. It has said the cross-border operation is aimed at "making islands and other settlements in Lake Chad untenable for Boko Haram Terrorists."

How did the group emerge?

In Boko Haram's formative years, Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state. "Yusuf's vision was extreme in the northern Nigeria context, but not so extreme that it was unrecognizable," writes Alexander Thurston in his 2017



book on the group. “In diverse ways, most northern Muslims believe that Islam provides a framework that should shape public life.”

The group began to radicalize amid episodic clashes between Christians and Muslims and as security forces adopted harsher tactics against suspected militants. A flash point for the group came in 2009, when a police crackdown set off an armed uprising in Bauchi State that soon spread in the northeast. Government forces killed more than eight hundred people, including many suspected Boko Haram members, in ensuing protests. Following the uprising, Yusuf was murdered while in police custody.

How has Boko Haram evolved in recent years?

Boko Haram splintered into at least two factions following Yusuf's death. Today, Abubakar Shekau heads one faction, which appears to remain focused on fighting the Nigerian government in the northeast. Several times, Nigeria's military claimed to have killed Shekau, but videos of the leader have emerged as recently as 2018.

For at least the last two years, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Yusuf's son, has led a second faction, which is believed to have the same ultimate goals as Shekau's but a less strict view as to what constitutes apostasy. Some analysts say the increasingly grisly nature of Boko Haram's atrocities sparked rifts within the group.

Boko Haram analysts and Nigerian security officials have offered varying assessments of the group's links to other militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The group declared allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, rebranding itself as the Islamic State's West Africa Province. Some say that focusing on an affiliation to these groups downplays the context in which Boko Haram emerged. Others argue that ignoring evidence of Boko Haram's ties to other Islamist militant groups may hinder an understanding of the insurgency.

What are its tactics?

Many of the group's activities are those typically associated with terrorism, including suicide bombings, kidnappings, and destruction of property, particularly schools. In recent years, it has increased attacks on soft targets, or relatively unprotected places, and used more women and children as suicide bombers. Beyond Nigeria, the group is most active in northern Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

Reports suggest that Boko Haram has been linked to the deaths of more than thirty-seven thousand people since 2011. About half of those killed were suspected Boko Haram militants, while roughly 45 percent were civilians and 5 percent were security forces.

How has the Nigerian government responded?

Nigerian security forces have made sizable gains against Boko Haram with the help of neighboring states, but the momentum to stamp out the insurgent group appears to have slowed in recent years, and communities in the country's northeast remain beleaguered.



In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan launched a major offensive against Boko Haram, declaring a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. While national forces claimed some success in pushing militants out of cities, attacks in rural areas continued with regularity. Nigerian troops have been accused of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings.

Boko Haram attacks escalated in 2014 and 2015, raising doubts about the government's progress toward containing the group. In particularly brazen operations, the group claimed a bombing of an Abuja bus station that killed nearly one hundred people on April 14, 2014, the same day it abducted more than two hundred schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok. The latter attack prompted an international outcry and evoked harsh criticism among many Nigerians of the Jonathan administration's slow response.

Elected president in 2015, Muhammadu Buhari has made some modest reforms [PDF] to improve the military's effectiveness against Boko Haram. Buhari, a former military dictator (1983–1985), moved the military's headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri, increased funding for operations in the area, and appointed new military leadership.

What support have other states provided?

Nigeria has sought military support from its neighbors, who increasingly suffered attacks during Boko Haram's upsurge. Since 2015, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as part of a multinational force authorized by the African Union. The coalition has been credited with helping the Nigerian military retake much of the territory [PDF] claimed by Boko Haram and reduce violence linked to the group to levels seen prior to 2014.

Security partners beyond Africa have also come to Nigeria's aid. The United States designated Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization in late 2013, but at times Washington has withheld military assistance out of concern over Nigeria's counterterrorism strategy and alleged human rights abuses. Following the abductions in Chibok, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States pledged additional assistance, including equipment and intelligence support. U.S. assistance related to Boko Haram totaled more than \$400 million by early 2016. In early 2018, U.S. President Donald J. Trump pushed through a roughly \$600 million deal to sell a dozen Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria to support its counterterrorism efforts.

For its part, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the insurgent group in 2014. Analysts said the move was largely symbolic, as the financial assets and movements of Boko Haram militants are difficult to track.

Chad Basin Campaign (2018-2019)

The Chad Basin campaign of 2018–2019 is a series of battles and offensives in the southern Chad Basin, particularly northeastern Nigeria, which take place amid the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency. The Chad Basin witnessed an upsurge of insurgent activity from early November 2018, as rebels belonging to the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram



launched offensives and several raids to regain military strength and seize territory in a renewed attempt to establish an Islamic state in the region. These attacks, especially those by ISWAP, met with considerable success and resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The member states of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), namely Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon responded to the increased insurgent activity with counter-offensives, though these have so far failed to fully stem the rebel advances.

Operation YancinTafki

Around 21 February 2019, the MJTF coalition launched an offensive codenamed Operation YancinTafki around Lake Chad in order to drive the rebels back, and destroy their bases in the Lake Chad region. As part of this operation, about 500 Chadian soldiers entered Nigeria to assist the Nigerian military in its home areas. Nevertheless, terror attacks and continued offensive operations by the insurgents greatly hindered the general elections in northeastern Nigeria on 23 February 2019. Most notably, ISWAP fired several Grad rockets at Magumeri, and launched an unsuccessful attack on Geidam, while Boko Haram assaulted Gwoza. Several other, smaller clashes also took place on 23 February.

On 25 April, Nigerian Defense Minister Mansur Dan Ali declared that "the Boko Haram terror network has been overwhelmed and the leadership structure is presently decimated". Analyst Andrew McGregor commented this claim by noting that "despite the Nigerian Army's repeated claims of imminent victory, villagers and forest workers continue to be slaughtered" by the insurgents. Two days later, ISWAP launched a major attack on the military base at Mararrabar Kimba, using motorcycles, 12 technicals as well as three armored personnel carriers. The Nigerian defenders were overrun, and forced to retreat, whereupon the rebels captured much military equipment and withdrew with their loot.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, is an Islamist militant organization (of al-Qaeda) which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. To that end, it is currently engaged in an anti-government campaign.

The group originated as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It has since declared its intention to attack European (including Spanish and French) and American targets. The group has been designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, Australia, Canada, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Membership is mostly drawn from the Algerian and local Saharan communities (such as the Tuaregs and Berabiche tribal clans of Mali), as well as Moroccans from city suburbs of the North African country.] The leadership are mainly Algerians. The group has also been suspected of having links with the Horn of Africa-based militant group Al-Shabaab.



AQIM has focused on kidnapping for ransom as a means of raising funds and is estimated to have raised more than \$50 million in the last decade.

Recent Timeline

1 July 2018: A suicide bomber drove a vehicle loaded with explosives into an army patrol and detonated it in the Malian city of Gao. Four civilians were killed and 31 others, including four French soldiers, wounded in the attack, AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack.


8 July 2018: The Uqba bin Nafi Battalion, the Tunisian wing of AQIM, claimed responsibility for an attack which killed six Tunisian policemen in Ghardimaou, Jendouba Governorate.

20 January 2019: AQIM claims the attack on 10 UN Mali peacekeepers due to Chad's restoration of relations with Israel.

Useful Links

<https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/al-shabaabs-mata-hari-network/>

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042>



Agenda 2 : Addressing the security of populations affected by instability in Central and Northern Africa



SUDAN

Summary

On 19 December 2018, a series of demonstrations broke out in several Sudanese cities, due in part to rising costs of living and deterioration of economic conditions at all levels of society. The protests quickly turned from demands for urgent economic reforms into demands for President Omar al-Bashir to step down.

The violence of the government's reaction to these peaceful demonstrations sparked international concern. On 22 February 2019, al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and dissolved the national and regional governments, replacing the latter with military and intelligence-service officers. On 8 March, al-Bashir announced that all of the women jailed for protesting against the government would be released. On the weekend of 6–7 April, there were massive protests for the first time since the declaration of the state of emergency. On 10 April, soldiers were seen shielding protesters from security forces, and on 11 April, the military removed al-Bashir from power in a coup d'état.

Following al-Bashir's removal from power, street protests organized by the Sudanese Professionals Association and democratic opposition groups continued, calling on the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) to "immediately and unconditionally" step aside in favor of a civilian-led transitional government, and urging other reforms in Sudan. Negotiations between the TMC and the civilian opposition to form a joint transition government took place during late April and in May, but stopped when the Rapid Support Forces and other TMC security forces killed 118 and injured and raped others in the Khartoum massacre on 3 June.

Opposition groups responded to the massacre and post-massacre arrests by carrying out a 3-day general strike from 9–11 June and calling for sustained civil disobedience and nonviolent resistance until the TMC transfers power to a civilian government.¹ On 12 June the opposition agreed to stop the strike and the TMC agreed to free political prisoners; renewed negotiations to form a civilian government were planned.

How did it all begin?

The unrest in Sudan can be traced back to December 2018, when President Bashir's government imposed emergency austerity measures in an attempt to stave off economic collapse.

Cuts to bread and fuel subsidies sparked demonstrations in the east over living standards and the anger spread to Khartoum.

The protests broadened into demands for the removal of Mr Bashir - who had been in charge for 30 years - and his government.



The protests reached a climax on 6 April, when demonstrators occupied the square in front of the military's headquarters to demand that the army force the president out.

Five days later, the military announced that the president had been overthrown.

Who are the opposition?

The economic problems brought Sudanese from all walks of life to the streets, but the organisation of demonstrations was taken on by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) - a collaboration of doctors, health workers and lawyers.

The protesters are mostly young, reflecting the country's demographics, but people of all ages have been seen in the crowds.

Women are at the forefront of the demonstrations and a video of a woman who has been named Kandaka, meaning Nubian queen, leading the chants has gone viral.

When the military took power in April, demonstrators stayed put outside its headquarters and insisted that it transfer authority to a civilian administration.

Talks between the ruling generals and the protest organisers, who have come together under the umbrella group Alliance for Freedom and Change, initially showed little sign of progress, but they eventually came to an agreement.

So who is in charge now?

A council of generals assumed power on 11 April but it has struggled to return normality to the country.

The seven-member Transitional Military Council (TMC) is led by Lt-Gen Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan. The council says it needs to be in charge to ensure order and security.

But the army is not a unified force in Sudan. There are other paramilitary organisations and various Islamist militias that hold some sway.

The military has also faced international condemnation for launching a violent attack on protesters in Khartoum on 3 June.

The US condemned what it called a "brutal attack" and the UK said the military council bore "full responsibility".

In response, the TMC expressed "sorrow for the way events escalated", saying that the operation had targeted "trouble makers and petty criminals".

What did the two sides agree?

The military and protesters agreed on 15 May to a three-year transition period to civilian rule.



Demonstrators argue that Mr Bashir's regime is so deeply entrenched that a long transition is needed to dismantle his political network and allow fair elections.

The two sides also agreed on the structure of a new government - including a sovereign council, a cabinet and a legislative body.

But the military leaders scrapped all of these agreements on 3 June and said fresh elections would be held within nine months.

The TMC's head said they had decided to "stop negotiating with the Alliance for Freedom and Change and cancel what had been agreed on".

Former British ambassador to Sudan, Rosalind Marsden, told the BBC that the snap election would "simply pave the way for much of the old regime to come back into power".

The announcement came shortly after the violent crackdown on protesters in Khartoum.

In the wake of killings, the leaders of the pro-democracy movement said they were cutting all contact with the TMC and called for "total civil disobedience" and a general strike.

What about mediation?

When talks broke down, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed flew to Sudan to try to broker a new agreement between the two sides.

After days of talks, his special envoy, Mahmoud Dirir, announced on 11 June that protest leaders had agreed to suspend widespread strikes and return to the negotiating table. Mr Dirir said that, in return, the military had agreed to release political prisoners.

No firm date for the resumption of talks was given.

The privately-owned Baj News website reported that the opposition was insisting on an independent investigation into the violent crackdown before direct talks restart.

What has the international response been?

Most African and western countries have backed the protesters.

Saudi Arabia has urged discussions between the two sides, but not directly condemned military violence.

Along with the UAE and Egypt, it perhaps fears the protests could inspire similar events to take place on home turf.

The TMC's vice president, Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, also known as Hemeti, flew to Saudi Arabia last month to meet the crown prince Mohamed Bin Salman, promising to stand with the



kingdom against threats and continue sending Sudanese troops to help the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

The African Union (AU) has suspended Sudan from its membership until a civilian led transitional authority is established.

The UN is removing all non-essential staff from Sudan but China and Russia have blocked moves to impose sanctions.

The US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, condemned the Khartoum violence, calling it "abhorrent".

But the BBC Africa editor Fergal Keane said this will only mean something if the US demands that its regional allies - Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates - exert pressure on the Sudanese military.

Libya

Dictator Gaddafi was captured and killed in Sirte on 20th October 2011. Gaddafi loyalists continued a string of low level insurgencies even after the civil war. The militia that participated in the civil war had a strained relationship with the NTC, with the government trying to integrate them into the military. This only served to legitimize such armed groups like that of General Khalifa Haftar's who renamed his armed group the Libyan National Army (LNA).

Who is against whom?

The Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Prime Minister Fayez Serraj, is recognized by the UN and the international community. The second Libyan Civil War is an ongoing conflict between this government, and the Islamist government of the General National Congress (GNC), also based in Tripoli. The GNC rejected the results of the 2014 election, and is led by the Muslim Brotherhood and backed by other armed militias.

After March 2016, conflict between the two rival parliaments, the Libyan House of Representatives and the General National Congress (GNC), intensified. Despite previously supporting it, the Libyan House of Representatives withdrew its recognition of the GNA by voting against it in the summer of 2016 and becoming their rival for governing the country. Despite being backed by only parts of the GNC and without formal approval from the Libyan House of Representatives, who called for new elections to be held by February 2018, the GNA is still recognized, as of 2019, by the United Nations as Libya's legitimate government.

The HoR, also known as the Council of Deputies, the strongest in eastern Libya, has the loyalty of the Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, and has been supported by airstrikes by Egypt and the UAE.[83] The GNC, based in western Libya is backed by various different militias (mainly Libya Dawn in the west and Libya Shield in the east) with some support from Qatar, Sudan and Turkey.

In early July 2017, Khalifa Haftar announced that his forces had taken over Benghazi, the second largest Libyan city in an effort to secure military control in critical areas in the region. He




remains resolute in his aim to completely dismantle the Libyan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and any other Islamic terrorist organisations within the country. Haftar launched an attack on Tripoli on 4th April 2019, that put at risk months of peace talks and killing approximately 739 people, in an attempt to overthrow the GNA. In the past USA has supported the UN recognised GNA, along with UK and France, until when President Trump appeared to break that policy in May, in a phone call with Haftar, during which he voiced support for a shared vision with the commander. The GNA maintains its stronghold in the capital.

Effects of the conflict

The armed clashes have led to thousands of people being killed and injured. There is large scale damage to vital infrastructure. According to UNHCR figures 286,629 Libyans are currently internally displaced out of which 55,770 are registered refugees or asylum seekers. However the true scale of IDPs is unclear and host communities are under a lot of pressure as this number is continually increasing. According to International Organization for Migration some 6,000 migrants are held in detention centres in Libya, while hundreds more are held by armed groups throughout the country. They often face specific protection issues including grave human rights violations by state and non-state actors. Key humanitarian needs like access to critical services such as healthcare, education, safe drinking water and sanitation along with access to basic household goods and commodities are unavailable to the general population.

Reduced exports along with falling prices have caused a steady decline on Libya's national revenues. Oil output dropped from 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) before the 2011 revolution to 1.2 million bpd in 2019. Production levels are continued to be subjected to disruptions, owing to recurring military campaigns and field changes. The repeated emergencies since 2013 and constraints facing Libya's finances and a scarcity of budgetary allocations, have not allowed a proper recovery of public sector services, especially health services, which were already weak and dependent on foreign health workers.



Some health facilities have become inaccessible because of security constraints while some were damaged and looted. The country has seen the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS amongst intravenous drug users in the world. There are extensive shortages of medicine, medical



supplies and vaccines. Continued fighting in Benghazi, Ubari, Brak City and Tripoli have affected accessibility for national and international humanitarian aid workers. Many people in conflict zones are likely to be affected by symptoms of distress caused by continuing danger, loss and trauma, compounded by the insufficient number of health workers in this field present in Libya.

The United Nations, along with its aid partners launched a Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), appealing for approximately \$202 million, meant to provide food, healthcare, protection especially from buried explosive hazards, shelter and sanitation services. The newly established crisis committees have not been able to successfully manage the on-going crisis owing to a lack of coordination between committees amongst other factors. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to implement quick impact projects, striving to create conditions of peaceful co-existence between IDPs and their host communities. Over a thousand individuals were evacuated by the UNHCR through the Gathering and Departure Facility (GDF).

International Response and Involvement

Algeria

On 16 May 2014, the Algerian government responded to a threat on its embassy in Libya by sending a team of special forces to Tripoli to escort its diplomatic staff in a military plane out of the country. "Due to a real and imminent threat targeting our diplomats the decision was taken in coordination with Libyan authorities to urgently close our embassy and consulate general temporarily in Tripoli," the Algerian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. Three days later, the Algerian government shut down all of its border crossings with Libya and the army command raised its security alert status by tightening its presence along the border, especially on the Tinalkoum and Debdab border crossings. This also came as the state-owned energy firm, Sonatrach, evacuated all of its workers from Libya and halted production in the country. In mid-August, Algeria opened its border for Egyptian refugees stranded in Libya and said it would grant them exceptional visas to facilitate their return to Egypt.

Egypt

Egyptian authorities have long expressed concern over the instability in eastern Libya spilling over into Egypt due to the rise of jihadist movements in the region, which the government believes to have developed into a safe transit for wanted Islamists following the 2013 coup d'état in Egypt that ousted Muslim Brotherhood-backed president Mohamed Morsi. There have been numerous attacks on Egypt's trade interests in Libya which were rampant prior to Haftar's offensive, especially with the kidnapping of truck drivers and sometimes workers were murdered. Due to this, the military-backed government in Egypt had many reasons to support Haftar's rebellion and the Islamist February 17th 2014 Martyrs Brigade operating in Libya has accused the Egyptian government of supplying Haftar with weapons and ammunition, a claim denied by both Cairo and the rebel leader. Furthermore, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who has become increasingly popular among many Libyans wishing for stability, has called on the United States to intervene militarily in Libya during his presidential candidacy, warning that Libya was becoming a major security challenge and vowed not to allow the turmoil there to threaten Egypt's national security.

Tunisia

Post-revolutionary Tunisia also had its share of instability due to the violence in Libya as it witnessed an unprecedented rise in radical Islamism with increased militant activity and weapons' smuggling through the border.



In response to the initial clashes in May, the Tunisian National Council for Security held an emergency meeting and decided to deploy 5,000 soldiers to the Libyan–Tunisian border in anticipation of potential consequences from the fighting. On 30 July, Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamdi said that the country cannot cope with the high number of refugees coming from Libya due to the renewed fighting. "Our country's economic situation is precarious, and we cannot cope with hundreds of thousands of refugees," Hamdi said in a statement. He also added that Tunisia will close its borders if necessary.

Others

- United Nations – On 27 August 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously approved resolution 2174 (2014), which called for an immediate ceasefire and an inclusive political dialogue. The resolution also threatened to impose sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, against the leaders and supporters of the various militias involved in the fighting, if the individuals threaten either the security of Libya or the political process.
- Russia – In February 2015, discussions on supporting the Libyan parliament by supplying them with weapons reportedly took place in Cairo when President of Russia Vladimir Putin arrived for talks with the government of Egypt, during which the Russian delegates also spoke with a Libyan delegation. Colonel Ahmed al-Mismari, the spokesperson for the Libyan Army's chief of staff, also stated that "Arming the Libyan army was a point of discussion between the Egyptian and Russian presidents in Cairo." The deputy foreign minister of Russia, Mikhail Bogdanov, has stated that Russia will supply the government of Libya with weapons if UN sanctions against Libya are lifted. In April 2015, Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani visited Moscow and announced that Russia and Libya will strengthen their relations, especially economic relations. He also met with Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and said that he request Russia's assistance in fixing the country's government institutions and military strength. The prime minister also met with Nikolai Patrushev, the Russian president's security adviser, and talked about the need to restore stability in Libya as well as the influence of terrorist groups in the country. Patrushev stated that a "priority for regional politics is the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya."
- United Kingdom – Following France's evacuation of some British nationals, the UK's embassy in Tripoli was the only diplomatic mission still open in the war-torn city. However, British diplomats residing there have sought refuge in a fortified compound south-west of the city to avoid the repetitive rocket attacks by warring militias. Three days earlier, a convoy carrying British diplomats from Tripoli to Tunisia came under fire when their vehicles refused to stop at an unofficial checkpoint on the outskirts of the city. On 2 August, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office finally announced that it would temporarily close its embassy in the capital and evacuate its staff. Ambassador Michael Aron said that the embassy would continue to operate from Tunisia. The following day, the Royal Navy ship HMS *Enterprise* managed to evacuate more than a hundred foreign nationals from the country to Malta, most of whom were British, in an operation off the coast of Tripoli. In March 2016, Ambassador Peter Millett called for "a much more coordinated approach between



the different groups, regions and forces and the armed groups in Libya" in order to defeat ISIL in Libya.

- United States – The United States has been active in post-2011 Libya with the military carrying out sporadic airstrikes and raids in the country, predominantly against Islamist groups. In 2014, U.S. commandos seized an oil tanker bound for anti-government militias and returned it to the Libyan national government. Two months later, the U.S. embassy in Tripoli was evacuated due to a heavy militia presence in the capital. In 2015, U.S. warplanes killed the head of the Islamic State in Libya in a strike. In 2016, U.S. President Barack Obama stated that not preparing for a post-Gaddafi Libya was the "worst mistake" of his presidency. On 19 January 2017, the day before President Obama left office, the United States bombed two IS camps in Libya, reportedly killing 80 militants. These types of operations have continued under the Trump administration with a September 2017 airstrike killing an estimated 17 IS militants.

Central African Republic

Background

François Bozizé became the president of the Central African Republic in 2003, before which he had already participated in a failed coup against his predecessor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, and was sent to exile. However he later rose to prominence in the position of army chief of staff and seized power in 2003 during an economic crisis.

Many rebel groups formed against Bozizé, mainly the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) led by Michel Djotodia, that rose up against the government forces, causing the Central African Republic Bush War that started approximately in 2004. The unrest lasted till 2007, with tens of thousands of people already displaced. Attacks against civilians continued throughout this time. Growing arms proliferation in the region served to only compound the humanitarian and economic crisis.

Finally, the unrest culminated in a peace agreement or ceasefire, brokered with the help of the neighbouring country of Chad, between the UFDR and the government. Under this agreement, the government provided amnesty to the rebels, recognised the UNFDR as a political party and integrated its fighters into the army. Conflict continued between the government and other rebel groups.

The cease fire did not hold long, however. The rebel groups accused Bozizé of not abiding by the rules of the cease fire and around September of 2008, fighting resumed once again between rebel groups and the government, with civilians caught in the middle of the two. The European Union Force (EUFOR) was officially declared operational on March 2008 in north eastern CAR and eastern Chad.

Around 2012, the Seleka coalition was formed, which consisted primarily of former rebel groups including the UFDR, the Union of Republican Forces (UFR) and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP). They demanded Bozizé be ousted from his presidency. Their aim was to impose a regime of Islamic imprint on the CAR region. This coalition claimed responsibility for many atrocious crimes like executions, rape and lootings, primarily against



Christian populations, which further exacerbated religious tensions. In retaliation, a Christian militia group was also formed, called the anti-balaka.

On 24th March 2013, Seleka rebels took over the capital Bangui, causing President Bozizé to flee to Cameroon. Michel Djotodia became the transitional president. The international community condemned the actions of the Seleka and imposed sanctions on the rebel leaders. Djotodia suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. African leaders declared that they did not recognize Djotodia as president.

Since Djotodia could not be considered a candidate for the presidency after the transitional period, the growing pressure from the international community over his inability to control the on-going sectarian violence, and having effectively lost control of the Seleka after the coalition had taken power, he dissolved the Seleka alliance. Djotodia was indicted with crimes against humanity and inciting genocide. He resigned from office on 10th January 2014.

The Anti-Balaka militias launched co-ordinated attacks against the Muslim populations. The aftermath of Djotodia's presidency was essentially said to be without any law and gross human rights violations were conducted by the anti-balaka, ex-seleka and other groups.

The presidential elections that took place on 14th February 2016 saw its victor as Faustin-Archange Touadera. However the government did not have control over much of the country outside the capital, while sectarian and communal violence increased further. The country also faced with violence from outside actors such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) which was a group of Ugandan rebels whose aim is to rule according to the Ten Commandments.

Michel Djotodia was reinstated head of the ex-Seleka which renamed itself the popular front for the rebirth of the central African republic (FPRC), and another called the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC).

International Response

The United Nations Security Council, in its 5748th meeting, successfully passed Resolution 1778 which established the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), to which CAR had earlier given its consent. Other EU and UN efforts continued to provide the country with development aid.

The Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA) was an African Union peacekeeping mission to stabilise the country which was later transformed into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), a UN peacekeeping mission started in 2014 to facilitate humanitarian assistance, support for justice and the rule of law and promote the DDR process.

In 2014, Amnesty International reported several massacres committed by anti-Balaka against the Muslim civilians, forcing thousands of Muslims to flee the country. In April 2015, Human Rights Watch published a report in which Muslim Women recounted their experiences of being held captive for 14 months in Podo, a village in south west CAR. To make matters worse, MINUSCA soldiers are being targeting by the rebel groups with recurrent reports of dead or missing MINUSCA soldiers.

The African Union and the United Nations are relaunching Central African Republic peace talks to promote dialogue between the government and armed groups in an international effort for lasting peace in the country. Representatives from 14 militias in CAR signed a peace accord in Bangui on 6th February 2019. The agreement could potentially alter the humanitarian context in



the CAR. However seven such prior agreements have failed since the conflict began in 2012. A major demand of these groups is general amnesty, which is opposed by the UN. CAR has set up a special criminal court to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity, and many militia chiefs have been cited in UN investigations and others are named in international arrest warrants. On 7th January 2019, the UN launched the 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for CAR, requesting nearly \$431 million to provide humanitarian assistance to 1.9 million people countrywide.

MINUSCA

Concerned with the security, humanitarian, human rights and political crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional implications, the Security Council authorized on 10 April 2014 deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation – MINUSCA – with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. Its other initial tasks included support for the transition process; facilitating humanitarian assistance; promotion and protection of human rights; support for justice and the rule of law; and disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation processes.

Effects of the Conflict

Despite peacekeeping efforts, the CAR remains to be the third largest humanitarian crisis in the world following Yemen and Syria. Due to the collapse of state structures since the 2013 conflict, the humanitarian community continues to provide CAR with essential services. Humanitarian agencies plan for the potential voluntary return of internally displaced persons to certain locations, once their security, basic needs and reconciliation can be addressed. In the first meeting of CONAFIT, EUFOR, MINURCAT and other humanitarian agencies, it was decided that no such return would take place as long as the necessary conditions were not in place. Illegal recruitment of children into armed groups continues to be rampant around the region, along with child trafficking and sexual violence against girls. MINURCAT worked closely with the UN country team to support police sector reform activities and restoration of state authority, especially in the north eastern region of CAR.

Since 2013, the breakdown of law and order, hundreds of armed groups beyond the Seleka and the anti-Balaka took over 70 percent of the country's territory, subjecting civilians to regular attacks. The government has almost no control outside the capital. Civilians are increasingly fearful of allowing children to attend school, with local level violence targeting both educational and healthcare facilities. By 2017, more than two thirds of the country's healthcare facilities had been destroyed, and transit to and from first aid areas is minimal.

The conflict threatens to push the country into a state of famine. 1.9 million Central Africans experience food insecurity, with the UN estimates only getting higher towards later in 2019. Obstacles to trade and farming have inflated the price of food and other essentials. Conflict related disruptions to livelihood and trade have reduced food consumption amongst surveyed populations. Individuals in refugee camps are given little or no humanitarian assistance and are left to fend for themselves.

Only eight out of 35 prisons function, with prison breaks being extremely rampant. The rebel attacks constricted greatly the ability of Reporters Without Borders to operate radio stations in the CAR. The increase in the number of displaced people affects the capacity of the humanitarian partners to provide water to the PK3 site, which is the largest in CAR. There is a



lack of funding to complete the DDR process and the sales of arms continue. In October 2018, an outbreak of hepatitis E- a virus affecting the liver that is primarily spread through faecal or oral transmission- was identified in the Ouham-Pende Prefecture, and its neighbouring areas. WHO and other health partners are providing essential medicines to local health facilities and supporting district level health teams to conduct awareness activities.

Out of the 5 million population of CAR, 1.1 million were displaced as of 2017, out of which 60,000 were internally displaced, mostly constituting children. This is the highest recorded level of displacement since the conflict began in 2013. Others seek refuge in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon. More than half of the country was in urgent need of humanitarian aid. The illegal occupation of land left behind by displaced persons, including looting and destruction of such houses is rampant. The 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the *Kampala Convention*) was ratified by CAR on 20th December 2010. However this convention has not yet been integrated into any national act. The finalization of the national policy regarding IDPs has been delayed due to the extreme violence throughout the country.

Sexual and gender based violence remains pervasive in CAR, specifically gang rape by both ex- Seleka and anti-Balaka groups. More than 70 percent of protection incidents recorded through the UNHCR protection monitoring system are related to SGBV. Underreporting of such cases not only exists because of fear of reprisal or stigmatization, but also because of lack of trust in or access to the judiciary or state authorities across the country.

Useful Links

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.848.com.car.9.05.2019.pdf>

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.834.press.statement.car.21.03.2019.pdf>

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/839th-psc-communicue-on-libya.pdf>

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.852.comm.sudan.27.05.2019III.pdf>

<http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc.854.comm.sudan.6.6.19.pdf>

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