CISMUN 2019

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

Countering the threat caused by Violent Extremism in Situations of Armed Conflict

Yash Vardhan Pansari

CHAIRPERSON'S ADDRESS

Greetings Delegates

Welcome to CISMUN19 and welcome the United Nations Security Council!

If you're here to have fun, I promise to try my best to give you a great time. If you're here for competition, I promise to be fair in judgement to the best of my ability. If you're here to learn, I promise that the committee will teach!

I have had the privilege to be a part of CISMUN since its second edition and for 2 of those years, I was in the SC, and for the other, I worked with the same agenda as this committee. Having spoken from both sides of the dais, I can empathise with each of your worries and would thus be more than happy to be approached by any of you regarding committee, the conference, or just a friendly chat.

Regarding debate, I know many delegates like to come up and quote resolutions, name obscure UN bodies, and read out reports. While knowledge and research is important, it has to be presented with spontaneity and logical context. Hence, remember to use logic and stick to policy and you should do fine. However, remember that just arguing the problem is useless if you don't end with solutions. Leave the world different better than you found it. Nothing ever comes from nothing.

Regards,

Yash Vardhan Pansari

ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Your chairperson, Yash Vardhan Pansari, began his journey in this very committee 3 years ago. He has seen this committee set benchmarks in the school circuit several times in the past and expects no less this year. He also holds several records for TV-watching and sleeping through classes. Making fun of science students or saying "CIE is easy" will lead to immediate disqualification so tread carefully :) ~~Best trolling on committee group gets highest points for etiquette~~

Your vice-chairperson, Sara Muthedath, is an avid social rights activist and political enthusiast who wishes to pursue sociology at a higher educational level. Her face is now well known to anyone affiliated with CISMUN and she has been on its executive board thrice before. As one of the senior most members of an EB which has a 15 year old chairperson, she is our Yoda.

Your director, Aneesh Bhattacharjee, is a student of IB 2 and has only very recently joined the circuit. However, the quick learner he is, his performance at CIS intramun managed to seriously impress one and all, allowing him to rise through the ranks.

Your rapporteur, Krishna Mishra, is a newcomer to the MUN circuit and can usually be seen haunting the buffet hall in various floral outfits. Krishna enjoys reading, origami, spreadsheets and wasting his life away on YouTube. He also holds a world record for going to MUNs and not showing up past the first day! (Haha psych even when he's there he sleeps through it) In the unlikely event that he does show up for all 3 days and doesn't sleep, his age or lack of experience have never been enough to stop him from claiming his award.

Frequently asked questions

FAQ

Important information about the committee that everyone should note

For marking related doubts, hold onto them till day 1 of committee. I intend on explaining marking to everyone before committee starts. Remind me if I forget

If you have any additional doubts, you can contact me at yashvp2003@gmail.com

1. **What procedure will we be following?**

   - UNAUSA but procedure exists to facilitate debate so at times we might have to slightly deviate from it to best facilitate debate.

2. **Will there be substantive chits in committee?**

   - No, unless there are extreme recognition issues but we assure you that such a scenario is very unlikely

3. **Will there be updates?**

   - If the flow of committee is very good without them then no. Otherwise, we can have them to improve the flow of debate.

4. **Will there be verbal Points of Information all the time?**

   - We will try our best to incorporate as many points as possible verbally but we'll have informal voting in committee for the specifics

5. **Are points of order for factual inaccuracy?**

   - Points of order are raised on the executive board for procedural inaccuracies only. However, the EB will be noting factual inaccuracies. Delegates can also point these out via points of information or speeches if they are relevant.

6. **Will communiques be allowed?**

   - No. However, several other forms of paperwork can be sent in when communication lines are opened. (Memorandums of understanding instead of joint public communiques, presidential statements, action orders, working papers, etc.) These can do the same thing as communiques but save time and make things more realistic.

About The Agenda

WHY DOES EXTREMISM THRIVE IN SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT?

It is evident that terrorist groups, like Da'esh and Al Qaeda, thrive in situations of armed conflict for a variety of reasons, most notably in Iraq, Syria, and Libya most flagrantly because of the availability of arms. Weaponry enables terrorists to take and keep power in areas that are vulnerable, and are often brought to terrorists as a result of military activities. Corruption in the defence systems of countries, especially countries that are less economically developed in which soldiers are not always compensated fairly, wherein two-thirds of all terrorist attacks take place, leads to an increasing number of arms falling in the hands of terrorist organisations often enabling them to maintain their tyrannical authority.

It may also be because of the living situation it creates for millions. Violations of international humanitarian law result in the radicalisation of individuals. The hostile environment coupled with the resources being exhausted oftentimes drive people to rely on methods of survival they would not otherwise consider. Armed conflict creates a context within which terrorism may thrive because it drives people to desperation, accompanied by the need for protection from external governments, and often causes civilians to harbour a deep hatred for 'foreigners' attacking their homeland, making recruiting individuals for terrorists much easier. Additionally, the political volatility accompanied by the unstable economy often results in an extremist mindset resulting in more support for terrorist organisations.

In the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, "terrorism is fundamentally the denial and destruction of human rights, and the fight against terrorism will never succeed by perpetuating the same denial and destruction."

Read Carefully

DISCLAIMER

We can understand how some delegates already have extensive knowledge of the agenda and would not need to go through the contents of the study guide, but I strongly recommend going through the FAQ page nonetheless for information specific to this committee.

This guide is a collection of credible information both: acquired from cited sources; and written originally by the executive board aiming to give delegates a rough understanding of the agenda.

We do not claim credit for directly and originally writing all of this guide's information. We do not expect, require, or want delegates to focus on the same things that this guide does. The direction in which delegates drive committee should be in line with the mandate of the committee, their foreign policies, and what committee as a whole *wants* to discuss.

Reading the entire guide is not mandatory but it is recommended to anyone with enough interest in the agenda. However, reading the entirety of all three middle east case studies would be informative. We do not recommend that delegates limit their research to the contents of this study guide. The extent of a delegates research could reflect on their performance. For further research, delegates can refer to the useful sources page and any other sources they might find helpful.

Case studies summary

THE MIDDLE EAST

Widely known as the root source of terrorist activities all over the globe, the Middle East also has three of the most widely discussed ongoing armed conflicts. As you would expect, these two aspects of the Middle East perfectly intertwine and hence the focus of this agenda on this particular region of the world.

Syrian Conflict: Estimates of the body count for the Syrian Civil War range from 4 to 6 lakh people and the number of internally displaced people is well above even ten times of that. The alleged popular sovereign is the Assad Government, recognised only as an illegitimate regime and a state sponsor of terror by several western nations. The Assad Government holds Syria's UN seat and claims, along with a few other countries supporting it, that most rebel groups opposing it are terrorist. Everyone, including the UN, however stands against generally recognised terror groups here like the Daesh.

Palestinian and Israeli Conflict: In a conflict so volatile that several countries have left the UNHRC because of it, every party has an enormous amount of dirt on their hands. The Political party with popular sovereignty over a good amount of the region has been called a terrorist organisation. In fact, even the legal holder of Israel's seat in the UN has been accused (by UN fact-finding missions) of acts well fitting the label of terrorism.

The conflict in Yemen: The Houthi movement, accused of both anti-sematic activities, and activities that allegedly hurt the Baha'i minority, has been criticized by The United States, Israel and Senegal amongst other countries, and has been declared a terrorist organisation by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Although this claim has been denied by Iran, the Houthi claim that they are supported by the Hezbollah, which is an Islamist political party and military group in Lebanon that and has itself been classified as a terrorist organisation.

Part 1

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

There was a tenuous ceasefire held up in Idlib, between the Syrian-Russian military alliance and anti-government armed groups. Anti-government groups in Idlib held several media activists and individuals back for trying to side with the government. After numerous reports of chemical attacks during the first half of the year, in an unprecedented step, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was given the required permission to claim responsibility for attacks in Syria.

Regardless of the ceasefire announcement made on 17 May, heavy shelling and aerial bombardment has sustained. This has left more than 160 civilians dead and some 270,000 others displaced. Since 28th April 2019, the World Health Organization had reported a total of 25 outbreaks targeting medical buildings such as hospitals and 22 health facilities, in northwestern Syria.

The Bashar al-Assad regime of Syria has intensified its air strikes on Idlib in the war-hit country's northwest and has also been accused of using chemical weapons. Any person or organization that can be labelled as an opposition would be a target for confinement in Assad's nightmarish prison system, where torture remains systematic and widespread. The government claims that rebel factions carried out some of the attacks that it has itself been accused off. However, external presumably unbiased institutions have rules that they could only have been carried out using equipment manufactured specifically by the government. An example of this is in Clause 46 of the 7th report of the OPCW JIM on the Khan Shaykum attacks.

Part 2

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

The government forces used a combination of unlawful tactics, including prohibited weapons, indiscriminate strikes, and restrictions on humanitarian aid, to force anti-government groups to surrender in these areas, resulting in further mass displacement. This displacement in turn benefits the Syrian government. According to the controversial Law 10 of their constitution, if IDPs or emigrants fail to return to their residence over a given period of time, the government can take over control of their land. Thus, the government has an eerily high amount of benefits from the intense displacement of people that seems to be caused as the aftermath of (allegedly) their own crimes against humanity.

The civil war has produced the greatest forced displacement of people since the second World War. It has evacuated about half the country's population of 22 million and has thus created a wild amount of refugees.

Since April, the Syrian military, with guidance and aid from Russian forces, have started an air bombing campaign in Idlib to retake the territory in what is expected to be a slow and bloody campaign. The Syrian-Russian military alliance has carried out hundreds of attacks every day across areas in the Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo governorates under the control of anti-government groups, killing an estimated 200 civilians, including 20 children.

Part 3

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

In 2018, the Syrian government, with the help of Russia and Iran, reclaimed areas in Eastern Ghouta (situated in the Damascus countryside) and the Daraa governorate. Their forces made use of illegitimate tactics, illegal weapons, unselective strikes, and limits on humanitarian aid. They aimed at forcing opposition forces to surrender in these areas, which once again caused mass displacement. Anti-government armed groups extensively attacked nearby government-held areas and constricted the ability of the civilians to flee hostilities.

In some of the affected areas, there was an insanely high level of collateral damage in terms of civilian losses and damaged infrastructure. Landmines implanted by The Daesh before escaping continued to injure and/or murder civilians. On top of everything, only a little progress has been made in arranging for the necessary resources for recovery, reparation for civilian victims of attacks. Groups like The Daesh and Al-Qaeda continue to operate in Syria to register abuses, ranging from summary executions and kidnappings to interference in aid delivery.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a monitoring group based in the UK, estimated the death toll since the start of the war to be as high as 511,000 as of March 2018. Prolonged fighting left 6.6 million displaced internally and 5.6 million around the world, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Between 2013 and 2018, Human Rights Watch and seven other independent, international organizations investigated and confirmed 85+ chemical weapons attacks – mostly perpetrated by the Syrian

Part 4
THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

A dynamic clash somewhat diminished, Russia and Syria called for evacuees to return and Syria passed laws to encourage remaking. In spite of this, administrative powers kept on abusing human rights and law, self-assertively keeping and exploiting individuals, and forcing difficult limitations on the opportunity of development.

Unpredictable assaults on regular citizens and non-military protests against the Syrian-Russian military partnership continued in 2018. In February, government powers propelled a military battle to retake Eastern Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus. More than 1,600 regular people were allegedly murdered between February 18 until March 21. The Syrian-Russian military coalition struck at least 25 therapeutic offices, 11 schools, and endless civilian habitations.

Gatherings to the contention kept on utilizing unlawful weapons. The Syrian-Russian military coalition utilized universally restricted group weapons and substance weapons to re-take control of strategic regions. Human Rights Watch researched 36 bunch ammo assaults between July 2017 and June 2018 and another two-dozen progressively conceivable group ammo assaults. Proof proposes that the coalition utilized ignitable weapons in Ghouta and Daraa. After a substance assault on Douma in Eastern Ghouta, there were endeavours reestablished worldwide to deflect utilization of compound weapons. Russia utilized its veto in the Security Council in February and April, counteracting the production of an UN-driven investigatory component. Be that as it may, in June, state signatories to the Chemical Weapons Conventions conceded the OPCW changeless approval to examine and allot obligations regarding compound weapons assaults.

Part 5

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Through February and April, hostile to government gatherings situated in Ghouta – including Jaysh al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, and Faylaq al-Rahmane – murdered and mutilated many regular folks in unpredictable assaults on Damascus. As per the UN Commission of Inquiry, the outfitted gatherings consistently self-assertively captured and tormented regular people in Douma, including individuals from religious minority gatherings.

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an Al-Qaeda member present in Idlib, completed self-assertive captures and kidnappings that focused neighborhood political rivals and columnists. Infighting left regular folks dead, as did repeated deaths and vehicle bombings. The gathering kept on meddling with compassionate access and helping circulation in territories under its control.

On July 25, the Daesh drove synchronous invasions in the al-Suweida governorate, murdering 200+ people and seizing 27+ individuals. They unlawfully executed one of the prisoners in August. In November, all the rest of the prisoners were liberated by the state news organization. Meanwhile, the destiny of thousands of those captured by The Daesh in the east of Syria before they lost the domain stays obscure, with little exertion by the Syrian Democratic Forces and US-driven alliance to reveal their whereabouts.

The US helped the SDF in northern Syria to confine many outside The Daesh suspects, and has started returning speculated warriors to their nations, without much transparency, raising human rights concerns.

Part 6
THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

In spite of the fact that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the US-driven alliance drove the Daesh out of Raqqa in October 2017, hand crafted landmines and dangerous gadgets planted by them before escaping kept on executing and injuring regular people. Between October 2017 and April 2018, 1,000+ individuals have been harmed or slaughtered by mines, as indicated by neighborhood therapeutic laborers.

On January 20, Turkey propelled a military hostile in Afrin locale in northwest Syria, beforehand under the control of the Kurdish-lion's share Autonomous Administration. As of March, the Turkish hostile apparently brought about the passing of many regular citizens, and uprooted several thousand as per the United Nations. Turkish media announced the YPG propelled aimless assaults on Turkish border towns and executed several regular citizens. Turkish-upheld non-state furnished gatherings partnered with the Free Syrian Army and seized, annihilated, and plundered properties of the Kurdish regular people in Afrin, while neighborhood activists detailed about 86 occurrences of maltreatment that seemed to add up to unlawful captures, torment, and vanishings by those gatherings. While the United States-driven alliance re-opened examinations concerning non-military personnel losses from its strikes and admitted to coincidentally executing regular people, it didn't give straightforwardness around these examinations nor pay for exploited people. In spite of the fact that exhumation of mass grave locales started in Raqqa city, little help has been given to grow clear conventions to save or forensically recognize the dead

Part 7

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

The Syrian Democratic Council, a regular citizen specialist working in regions retaken from The Daesh, and the Kurdish-lion's share Autonomous Administration administering uprooting camps in the upper east, reallocated distinguishing proof archives of dislodged people and self-assertively kept them from leaving the camps and moving openly. In a positive advance, in September, the Syrian Democratic Forces swore to quit selecting kids.

Since January, the Autonomous Administration and the Asayish, the nearby police, kept approximately 20 individuals from the Kurdish National Council, an alliance of resistance Kurdish gatherings, and sometimes seem to have persuasively vanished them.

As of August 30, in excess of 90,000 people were coercively vanished in Syria, most on account of the Syrian government, as per the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), a nearby checking association. The Violations Documentation Center (VDC), a nearby observing gathering, has ordered 60,000 names of those confined by the administration since 2011 whose destiny stays obscure.

In July, the Syrian government refreshed common vaults to incorporate demise testaments for many people recently kept or vanished by the legislature. The updates gave no particular subtleties other than date and, incidentally, reason for death, and the administration neglected to give the remaining parts to the families. In the meantime, the Syrian government keeps on confining and abusing such people in regions under its control.

Part 8

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Russia, Iran, and Turkey have more than once made responsibilities to determine subjective detainment and implemented vanishings as underwriters of the Astana talks. In December 2017, the underwriters built up a working gathering on detainments and snatchings in the Syrian clash. However, little advancement has been made.

In March, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued a report on sexual and sex-based viciousness from March 2011 to December 2017 finding that the assault and sexual savagery carried out by government powers and related volunteer armies added up to atrocities and violations against humankind. From January to April 2018 in excess of 920,000 people had been recently dislodged within Syria, as indicated by the UN. Neighboring nations – including Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon – kept on keeping Syrians from looking for refuge at their outskirts, in spite of genuine dangers of brutality. By September 2018, 5.6 million Syrians have taken shelter outside the nation, the larger part in neighboring nations.

As of May, Turkey had enlisted practically 3.6 million Syrian exiles in the nation. Since January, be that as it may, ten regions – including Istanbul and Hatay – suspended Syrian refuge searcher enrollment. Turkish security powers caught and ousted a large number of recently arrived Syrian haven searchers at the Turkey-Syrian outskirt during the year, and summarily expelled them to the war-assaulted Syrian governorate of Idlib. Turkey has expressed that it won't open its fringe to refuge searchers escaping threats in Idlib. Rather, Turkish specialists have opened a few dislodging camps in territories under their control in Syria.

Part 9

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

As of June 2018, Jordan has enrolled around 666,294 Syrian displaced people. Jordan completely wouldn't open the outskirt – shut since June 2016 – to approaching refuge searchers escaping threats in the southwest. Be that as it may, Jordan cleared individuals from the Syrian Civil Defense, a helpful crthe Daesh reaction group partnered with the resistance, whom Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada, among others, consented to resettle.

In 2018, Jordan started regularizing the stay of displaced people without residency licenses.

In excess of a million Syrian outcasts are enlisted with UNHCR in Lebanon. Lebanon's residency arrangement makes it hard for Syrians to keep up lawful status. Seventy-four percent of Syrians in Lebanon need lawful residency and hazard detainment for being in the nation unlawfully.

In 2017, Lebanese specialists ventured up calls for exiles to return, in spite of the progressing struggle and well-established feelings of dread of mistreatment. Few evacuees have come back to Syria under limited understandings, anyway these are not administered by UNHCR. A few displaced people have said they are returning a result of cruel approaches and disintegrating conditions in Lebanon, not on the grounds that they think Syria is sheltered. Districts in Lebanon persuasively ousted a great many exiles in mass ejections without a legitimate premise or fair treatment. Many thousands stay in danger of removal.

Part 10

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

The US recharged its allow of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to very nearly 7,000 Syrians living in the United States, however did not stretch out the status to any new Syrians. It likewise kept up a restriction on Syrian residents entering the United States. The European Union's reaction to the Syrian displaced person emergency kept on missing the mark, with its accentuation on keeping entries from Turkey and binding the individuals who do in packed, unsanitary camps on Greek islands.

Russia has approached the European Union and Western states to help reproduction in Syria, as of now anticipated to cost at any rate US$250 billion. The European Union and the United States have kept up that they won't support reproduction in government-held Syria without a political progress along the lines of the UN Security Council goals 2254. Be that as it may, a few European states, including France and Switzerland are trying to help restoration and adjustment endeavors in regions re-taken by the legislature, or have opened compassionate workplaces in Damascus.

The Syrian government passed Law 10 of 2018, engaging it to set up redevelopment zones for restoration and remaking ventures. The law engages the administration to appropriate occupants' property without fair treatment or satisfactory remuneration. In November, because of global weight, the Syrian parliament changed the law. In any case, there are as yet huge worries in the law that stay unaddressed. In Qaboun and Darayya the legislature has confined access for regular citizen occupants looking to come back to their homes, and has unlawfully wrecked inhabitants' private homes, without giving notification, elective lodging, or remuneration.

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

In territories constrained by anti-government gatherings and the Syrian Democratic Forces, most Western benefactors keep on giving compassionate guidance. Be that as it may, the United Kingdom and Netherlands have pulled back their help for adjustment and versatility in northwest Syria. The United States likewise solidified its subsidizing for recuperation and adjustment in territories caught from The Daesh, asking the UAE and Saudi Arabia to venture in to help neighborhood experts, which they did.

The UN-driven political exchanges stayed at a halt, while Russia proceeded with its endeavors to politically legitimize the administration's military increases. In January, Russia facilitated a Syrian People's Congress in Sochi to concede to another constitution. In spite of the fact that it neglected to accomplish its expressed target, the congress ordered the UN Special Envoy with the making of an established board of trustees. The board of trustees has not been made at this point.

The United States' strategies on Syria swayed. In August, the US reported it would draw back countless dollars in financing designated to modify portions of Syria recently held by The Daesh. In September, the US declared that it expected to keep up a military nearness in Syria, regardless of having reported a pullback before in the year. Russia, Turkey, and Iran proceeded with their tripartite gatherings on Syria, holding three summit-level gatherings in 2018 and three rounds of talks in the Astana procedure, dealings on de-acceleration held normally in Astana, Kazakhstan since 2017. Russia remains the essential arms provider to the Syrian government.

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

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In June, Germany's central government examiner allegedly issued a capture warrant for a senior Syrian military authority on charges of war violations. France issued its own capture warrants in November.

In late 2017, the UN Security Council restored the command for cross-fringe help conveyance. The helpful part of the Syrian clash is one of not many where the gathering looks after agreement. On responsibility, the gathering stays halted because of Russia's utilization of the veto.

In the meantime, the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), a semi extraordinary investigator's office set up by the UN General Assembly in December 2016, kept on social affairs and saved proof for future criminal indictments. The body is allegedly opening two cases in 2018.

Part 13

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights checked more losses inside the "Putin – Erdogan" zone where it rose to 21, including 8 minors. 3 of the doctor gatherings were killed in assaults by routine's warplanes on Maarrat Al-Nu'man city, where one of the airstrikes focused on a vehicle of one of the surgeon bunches in the zone. 6 people including a female youngster and a lady, were killed in airborne barrage by the warplanes on Hish town south of Idlib. 6 people including 4 kids and a ladies were killed in air strikes completed by the warplanes on al-Mastouma region in the southern wide open of Idlib. 2 children were killed in siege by the routine's warplanes on Kafr Sajna town in the southern wide open of Idlib. A lady was killed in elevated siege that focused Al-Ameriyeh town in the southern wide open of Idlib. A native was killed by routine's warplanes on the edges of Ma'arrat Mesrin, and a kid passed on influenced by wounds he had in flying assault by routine's warplanes on al-Barah town south of Idlib. This loss of life is required to rise on the grounds that there are many harmed individuals and some of them are in pre-basic circumstance. Additionally the warplanes of the Russian underwriter did 6 airstrikes on regions in Kafr Zita and Khan Shaykhun inside Idlib and Hama field. The quantity of rocket and ordnance shells propelled by the routine powers on zones in the northern and northwestern wide open of Hama (the southern farmland of Idlib) rose to 800. In northern Latakia, the quantity of losses after 12 pm to the routine powers and minute men faithful to them rose to 31. They were killed in the shelling, mine blasts, and the vicious conflicts northwest of Hama. Additionally, 27 contenders were killed during the ethereal and ground siege and the progressing fights since after 12 pm, including 9 of the agitator and Islamic groups.

Part 14

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

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Part 15

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

And with the fall of more casualties, it rose to at least 1865 (the number of people who were killed since the 30th of April 2019, the date of start of the most violent escalation in terms of aerial and ground bombardment, shelling, and targeting since the Putin – Erdogan agreement). Before the 20th of June 2019, the casualties were: 486 civilians including 120 children and 100 women. Another woman and two of her children were killed in Russian aerial bombardment on the countryside of Idlib and Hama, and 43 including 9 women and 5 children were killed in the fall of barrel bombs. 288 including 57 women, 73 children, and 4 members of the rescue teams were killed in targeting by regime's warplanes. 66 people including 10 women and 9 children were killed in a ground shelling carried out by the regime forces. 36 citizens including 15 children and 8 women were killed in shelling by the factions on al-Suqaylabiyah. while at least 773 of the jihadist groups were killed in the Russian airstrikes and the Syrian govt's shelling (accounting for 499 of the Jihadis) in response to the killing of 606 members of the regime forces in targeting and shelling by jihadi groups and factions.

The Daesh no longer holds any territory in Syria, as the Pentagon announced after the group lost its last pocket to another alleged terrorist group - US-backed Syrian Democratic Force (SDF) which largely comprises of PKK's Syrian wing People's Protection Units (YPG) militants. The complete fall of the last Daesh stronghold in eastern Baghouz, Syria, would end Daesh's self-declared caliphate, which at its height stretched across large parts of Syria and Iraq.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

Terrorism as politically motivated violence directed against noncombatants is no doubt as ancient as organized warfare itself, emerging as soon as one society, pitted against another in the quest for land, resources, and dominance. While terrorist violence has been present in the conflict between Jews and Arabs over Palestine for over eighty years, the prevalence of the rhetoric of 'terror' to describe Arab violence against Israeli and Western targets, is a more recent phenomenon. This rhetoric has fostered the popular perception that Arab terrorism is the central problem in the Middle East crisis, and that once solved, progress can be made on other issues. Terrorism between Arabs and Israelis is the product of deep divisions, entrenched strategies, and fundamental grievances, and no informed discussion can ignore its historical and political context.

The conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs is fundamentally a struggle over land, over who is to reside in, own, and possess sovereignty over the territory that is variously called Palestine and Israel. Anyone familiar with this conflict knows that more than land is at stake; both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs are conscious that their very identity is bound up with that land, its terrain, cities, villages, and monuments. The reasons for these mutual attachments reach far back into the history of both peoples, but the conflict dates from the inception of the Zionist movement in late 19th century Europe that called for the establishment of a Jewish state in the historic homeland of the Jewish people, Palestine.

Part 2

ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

In 1897, Palestine contained approximately 600,000 people, 95% Arab and 5% Jews. Faced with this imbalance Zionist leaders like Theodore Herzl came to favor a program for demographic change: first, to promote massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, and second, to encourage the emigration of the Arabs into the neighboring countries.

In late 1917, the British, whose forces now controlled Palestine, pledged to facilitate establishment of a Jewish national home and open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration. As a result, Jews went from 8% of the population in 1918 to 20% by 1931, and by 1948, after three decades of British rule, Jews made up one-third of the two million people in Palestine. Inducing the Arabs to emigrate proved more difficult.

In 1918, it became clear to the British authorities in Palestine the Arabs were opposed to Zionism and would resort to violence in order to stop a Jewish state from being established.

One Palestinian, Pasha Dajani, summed up the Arab attitude in 1919: If the League of Nations will not listen to the appeal of the Arabs, this country will be come a river of blood" (Morris 1999, 91).

Palestinian groups that have been involved in politically motivated violence include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Abu Nidal Organization, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas

Part 3

ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

Terrosist attacks in the region have included hostage taking, plane hijackings, stone throwing, stabbing, shootings, and bombings. Several of these groups are considered terrorist organizations by the United States government, Canada and the European Union.

In the mid-2000s Hamas started putting greater emphasis on its political characteristics and strengthened its popularity amongst Palestinians. In 2006 Palestinian legislative elections Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, prompting the United States and many European countries to cut off all funds to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, insisting that Hamas must recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous peace pacts.

After the Israel's unilateral disengagement plan in 2005 and the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections Hamas took control over all the Gaza Strip in June 2007 in a bloody coup. Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza strip increased the firing of Qassam rockets, mortars and Grad missiles on southern Israel. Attacks continued outside the Gaza strip perimeter, including the attack that resulted in the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit being captured and held in the Gaza Strip for over five years.

Hamas has made use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank. Hamas has adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled "between several hundred and 1,300 tons" of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza. Some Israelis and some Gazans both noted similarities in Hamas's military buildup to that of Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.

Part 4

ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT

During the Gaza War (2008–09), Palestinian militant groups fired rockets aimed at civilian targets which struck the cities of Ashdod, Beersheba and Gedera. Several rockets landed in schools and one fell close to a kindergarten, all located in residential areas. The UN fact finding mission stated that this constituted a deliberate attack against the civilian population and was unjustifiable in international law.

In 2013, Hamas stated that the "kidnapping of IDF soldiers is at the heart of Palestinian culture."

Part 1

THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN

The state of Yemen had been in conflict for decades, leading up to the civil war beginning in 2014, in part due to the death of the prior President, Ali Abdullah Salem, who was assassinated by the Houthi group, also recognized as Ansar Allah. The Houthi movement originated in the 1990s, taking over the Yemini capital city of Sana'a in 2014 with the help of Salem, overthrowing the then President, who Salem had abdicated to, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, before they were "betrayed" by Salem as he claimed allegiance to Saudi Arabia and its allies. The allies had, by then, sent in support for the government against what has now been called the 'coup'. The Houthi movement, accused of both anti-sematic activities, and activities that allegedly hurt the Baha'i minority, has been criticized by The United States, Israel and Senegal amongst other countries, and has been declared a terrorist organisation by both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The Houthis, controlling most of Northern Yemen, have been said to have increasingly superior tactics when combatting the Yemini government since 2004. The first six years were predominated by guerrilla warfare, but, by 2010, the Houthis were in possession of Yemeni military equipment, and have since been an apparently dangerous presence in Yemen. The civil war is accredited with taking the lives of 6872 Yemeni citizens as of November 2018.

The Yemeni government has, in fact, alienated a significant amount of the tribal population in Yemen, starting in 2006 with indiscriminate bombings of largely tribal areas, which has boosted the popularity of the Houthi organisation. The same group, which in 2004 could not defend its cave province in Sa'ada, was able to take control of strategic

THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN

cities in 2010, greatly disturbing the control the government has of the nation. Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, has benefitted greatly from the Houthi take over of the Yemeni government, and membership has apparently increased almost exponentially, having 4000 members in 2016 alone.

However, Houthi forces have been proven to have fired artillery indiscriminately I'm Yemeni cities, and has been accused of the tragedy in Taizz, Yemen's third largest city.. Additionally, On the 9th of May in 2017, the Houthis claimed the ballistic missile that had been launched at Riyadh, the Saudi Arabian capital. On the 14th of May, 2019, Houthi rebels carried out multiple drone attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Mohammed Abdul Salam, a Houthi spokesperson, declared that this action was taken due to the "genocidal" behaviour depicted by Saudi Arabia.

The Houthi organisation has taken hold of military equipment from the Yemini government, and have been accused of violating various human rights, as depicted by what may be considered war crimes above, whilst also implementing their own laws in the areas in which they have control, oftentimes trading protection for money. The human rights watch has documented 16 accounts of the Houthi groups taking hostages, which is considered a war crime, and has documented various cases of arbitrary detention. Members of the Baha'i community, as well as the Hewish minority, have been detained without reason except prejudice.

THE CONFLICT IN YEMEN

In fact, in 2018, the UN Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen concluded that the Houthi group was partly responsible for the perceived war crimes and unnecessary detention of citizens in Yemen. The Houthi forces, accused of recruiting soldiers as young as 11, have even restricted humanitarian workers and aid into the county, despite the Yemeni crthe Daesh being declared the largest humanitarian crthe Daesh.

Additionally, the former President, Salem, accused Iran for backing the Houthi movement, which would essentially translate to the war over Yemen being a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two states with no diplomatic ties, partially due to the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran. Although this claim has been denied by Iran, the Houthi claim that they are supported by the Hezbollah, which is an Islamist political party and military group in Lebanon that and has itself been classified as a terrorist organisation wholly by the United States, Israel, the GCC states, and Canada, has not.

DEFINING TERRORISM

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

(For the sake of this committee "violent extremism" and "terrorism" are interchangeable terms with reasonably equivalent meanings so please do not waste time pointing out the difference unless it is pivotal to a relevant point for debate)

When it comes to defining terrorism, it is more difficult to provide one framework or definition that has come close to the level of consensus that has been reached about a definition of peace. Terrorism scholars often start writing about terrorism by explaining that the term is highly contested, and that a universally accepted definition has yet to be agreed upon. Key points of disagreements arise on many aspects of the definition: who can be the acting party, what exactly is a terrorist attack, and what is the goal? Similar to the term peace, terrorism can be traced back to at least the Roman period, descending from the verb 'terrere': to frighten. Many scholars regard the French Revolution as the first episode when terrorism was employed. "La Terreur", as it was called, was meant to both eliminate and frighten opponents of the Revolution, many of whom faced their fate under the guillotine. It was a state actor during revolutionary France that was the main executor of terror. The perception of terrorism being the domain of state actors would change over the course of time.

The context in which terrorism takes place has also widely varied over time. This is most clearly shown by American historian David Rapoport, who in his seminal article "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11" has explained how terrorism has changed its manifestations over time. The first wave of modern terrorism, as defined by Rapoport, is the anarchist wave, spearheaded by those who tried to topple the Tsarist regime in Russia. This was followed by an anti-colonial wave started from the 1920s, targeting colonial powers such as the French in Algeria. In the 1960s, a "new left wave" started in which groups such as the Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany and the Brigate

Part 2

DEFINING TERRORISM

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Rosse in Italy fought the capitalist system and saw themselves as vanguards for the "impoverished masses" of the Third World. Since 1979, there has been a religious wave, which is very much dominated by, but not exclusively linked to, jihadist terrorism. Rapoport's waves theory helps us to understand that terrorism takes place in widely varying contexts – from "liberation struggles" against colonial powers to terrorism employed in democratic, largely non-violent countries such as West-Germany and Italy.

Traditionally, terrorism is seen as something that takes place in peacetime. Alex Schmid proposed to see terrorism as "the peacetime equivalents of war crimes" during a meeting of the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in 1992. This definition again entered the picture in 2004 when the Supreme Court of India adopted this definition in the Singh v. Bihar court case. This definition is rather exceptional, as most definitions make no direct reference to either peace or conflict. An example of someone who has referred to peace is Ekaterina Stepanova. In "The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research", edited by Alex Schmid, she proposes an interesting categorization of sub-types of terrorism. The first category is the "'classic terrorism of peacetime' [which] is separate from any wider armed conflict, and includes 'stand-alone' left- and right-wing terrorism".[10] The second type is "conflict-related terrorism" where terrorism is employed as a "tactic incorporated into asymmetric armed conflict", and can be used alongside other tactics such as guerrilla warfare. The third form is called "superterrorism", of groups with a global agenda and existential and non- negotiable aims. Although the

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latter category is of a somewhat different nature – describing the aims rather than the context of terrorism – this categorization is rather unique in distinguishing between "peacetime" and "conflict-related" terrorism.

Most terrorism definitions do not make such explicit references to peace, or more broadly speaking, the context in which an act of terrorism takes place. The main points of discussion among terrorism scholars and other parties who define terrorism such as government agencies arise about the actors, targets, and goals of terrorism. Two examples that reflect some of the more contentious issues within this debate are the definitions proposed by Israeli terrorism scholar Boaz Ganor and the definition proposed by a governmental actor – the US State Department. Ganor wrote that "terrorism is the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political ends". The US State Department defines terrorism in its annual terrorism as "perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents". Interestingly, the US State Department disqualifies state actors from being perpetrators of terrorism, an approach premeditated, politically motivated violence that is followed by many terrorism scholars. This approach, however, is different from the one used in IHL, as will be shown in the next section. Both definitions seem to suggest, albeit indirectly, that terrorism is an act conducted outside of the context of an armed conflict, or, if during an armed conflict, does not target the legitimate adversary (combatants of the other party). The specification of the targets is also a point where the two definitions differ between simply civilians (Ganor) or

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noncombatants (US State Department). Also, it could be argued that there is a subtle difference between being motivated by political considerations (US State Department) or aiming to achieve political goals (Ganor).

What is missing from these definitions, and what could help to distinguish terrorism from related types of political violence, is the element of fear. As shown in the categorisation of Stepanova, terrorism sometimes virtually enters the domain of other types of political violence. When terrorism is perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict, another part of the definitional question surfaces: what is the difference between an insurgency and terrorism? This becomes particularly relevant, for instance, in the current situation with regard to IS. Are they first and foremost a terrorist organisation, or could they rather be called an insurgent movement? In surgency has been defined as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas". Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Mario Fumerton have aptly explained how insurgency and terrorism can be best understood by way of differentiating between strategies and tactics. They show how terrorism could function both as a tactic and a strategy. As a tactic, it could be used in an insurgency (a strategy generally aimed at establishing overall political-military control over a territory and its population by installing competing authority systems). Terrorism could also be a strategy in itself, in which the terrorist attacks are used as a fear-inspiring tactic - not so much aimed at overall political-military control over a territory and its population - but rather aimed at compelling

DEFINING TERRORISM

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another actor to do or abstain from doing something by targeting a third party). This distinction is relevant when discussing how terrorism can be distinguished from other types of political violence. This paper, however, tries to analyse how terrorism is actually present in different contexts. To that end, this paper will from now on focus on acts of terrorism, or in other words, terrorism as a tactic, recognising that these can occur within diverse contexts. Terrorist attacks distinguish themselves from regular armed attacks by their clear focus on an indirect target and by their fear-inspiring nature. The presence of terrorism within armed conflicts is certainly not a new phenomenon, neither is the transnational nature of terrorism surprising, but it has become increasingly relevant after the attacks on 9/11 and the 'War on Terror', as well as in light of the current fight against IS in Syria and Iraq.

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

Firstly, it is important to note that terrorism in peacetime can be prosecuted under a number of United Nations' Terrorism Conventions, such as the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, or (international) criminal law. As IHL scholar Helen Duffy has shown, it would however be overly optimistic to assume that terrorism is an accessible legal concept: finding a universally accepted legal definition has been as much of a challenge as finding an academic one. To evade this, most bodies of law do not define terrorism as such, but define specific forms of terrorism. The absence of an overall definition has not hindered to prosecution of particular terrorist crimes, and thus, might be less of a legal problem than is sometimes being assumed. States are continuously revising their domestic legislation to adapt to the changing nature of terrorism. More pressing issues and ambiguity in this field seems to surround terrorism in the context of the opposite of peace: an armed conflict. In order to study this, it is necessary to explain what can actually be called an armed conflict.

This is where we enter the domain of International Humanitarian Law. Shortly after the Second World War, the Geneva Conventions were adopted to guide the conduct of armed conflict and to limit civilian suffering as much as possible. These conventions – and the Additional Protocols - are all linked to the legitimate conduct of war (jus in bello), and come into force in case of an armed conflict.

Part 2

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

The Conventions make an important distinction between two types of armed conflict: international armed conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The first encompasses a conflict with two or more states involved. It is important to note that a formal declaration of war does not have to be recognised by all parties, or could even be absent. A non- international armed conflict occurs in the territory of a "High Contracting Party" (a state) and involves at least one or more non-governmental groups. There seems to be some disagreement about whether or not a state actor has to be involved. According to a Congressional Research Service Report prepared for the US government, "an internal conflict involves a legitimate state engaged in conflict with an armed group that has attained international personality". The International Committee of the Red Cross, however, asserts that the state on whose territory the conflict is taking place does not necessarily have to be involved. Still, both statements could be true in case where a foreign state is involved in a conflict with a non-state actor, on the territory of another state. However, as will be explained, this has incited a fierce debate within IHL about whether or not such a transnational conflict can still be called a NIAC.

When it comes to the case of an alleged NIAC, it must be outlined how intense the hostilities must be in order to qualify for an armed conflict instead of mere internal disturbances or skirmishes.

Part 3

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

Two criteria are usually employed to determine whether the violence can be called an armed conflict:

1) "the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity." This may be the case, for example, when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the government is obliged to use military force against the insurgents, instead of mere police forces.

2) "non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as "parties to the conflict", meaning that they possess organized armed forces. This means for example that these forces have to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations". It is determined on a case by case basis if such criteria are met.

Whereas IHL applies to both IAC and NIAC, and both provide strict regulations aimed to protect the civilian population and others from disproportional or extreme suffering, there are a few important differences between the two that are worth mentioning. The most important difference is that in an IAC, captured prisoners of the opposing state are entitled to a "Prisoner of War" (POW) status, which protects them from torture and abuse, entitles them to receive humane treatment, and demands their swift release after the conflict has ended. In case of a NIAC, the combatants of the opposing, non-state actor do not enjoy such a legal status.

Part 4

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

IHL makes implicit as well as explicit references to terrorism. In article 33 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, it is stated that "collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited". Furthermore, "acts of terrorism" are explicitly mentioned as one of the following acts that "shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever" in Article 4 of one of the Additional Protocols. With regard to terrorism directed against the civilian population, another article states that "acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited". Essentially, this makes it possible to prosecute terrorism during armed conflicts as a war crime. This article has been invoked, for instance, during the trial against Stanislav Galić, commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, for his acts of terrorism against the civilian population near Sarajevo.

Thus, when it comes to the question whether or not terrorism can be executed by a state actor, IHL takes a clear position: states can be involved in terrorism, and these acts of terrorism can be prosecuted as war crimes, if it has been established that there is an armed conflict. In this sense, terrorism and war crimes clearly overlap.

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

As illustrated, IHL can be used to prosecute terrorist acts, and there is no provision that prohibits this. With regard to terrorism and IHL, there are two other challenges that seem more problematic. Firstly, the nature of some of today's fights against terrorist organizations raises questions about whether this should fall under IHL. Secondly, some scholars worry that applying IHL to these cases would have serious repercussions. When it comes to the first question, part of the problem lies in the old dichotomy between IAC and NIAC. The Geneva Conventions remained rather vague about what could be called a NIAC. This question became more pressing after the attacks on 9/11 that were followed by a "Global War on Terror". This is linked to an interesting paradox that was identified by Helen Duffy, who writes that "armed groups engaged in an armed conflict are often labelled 'terrorists' (…). Conversely, one of the unusual characteristics of the so-called 'war on terror' has been the labelling of terrorist organisations as 'enemy combatants' engaged in an armed conflict'. This has also led to ambiguity about whether a state actor (the USA) fighting a non-state actor/terrorist organization (Al Qaeda) in the territory of a third state (Afghanistan) should be seen as an NIAC, IAC, or neither of the two. This still remains up to debate, and claims have been made to justify all three of those. As a result, some scholars have proposed to use the term "transnational armed conflict" to better capture the non-state, international nature of such a conflict.

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

The US government made attempts to sell the "War on Terror" as an IAC, but this has not been legally established.

Against the backdrop of the current fight against IS, there might be legal arguments to revise this idea of this particular fight not being an IAC or NIAC. Duffy mentions that there is an important exception to the legal common practice of seeing an IAC only as a conflict between states. This is when the actor exercises 'quasi-state' functions. Whereas this was arguably not applicable to the case of Al Qaeda and the 'War on Terror', this might be regarded differently in the case of IS. IS has been an 'extraordinary' terrorist organisation in the sense that it has been able to conquer, control and establish effective authority over large swaths of territory. It has also increasingly developed a state-like structure, expanding its bureaucracy, with several "governmental bodies", such as ministries. It has for instance opened ministries of agriculture, public health, and education, which are only indirectly related to the conflict. Also, some of the reasons why the fight against Al Qaeda could not be seen as a NIAC, appear also less relevant in the case of IS. When Duffy discussed whether or not Al Qaeda met the criteria to be seen as an actor in a NIAC, she doubts this was the case. Criteria are, amongst others, "scope and membership, sufficient organisation and structure, and the capability of abiding by the rules of IHL".

Part 4

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

IS would score a lot better on these criteria than Al Qaeda did. For instance, it has been reported that IS members need to fill out registration forms upon desiring to join the group, which would make the question proving group membership much easier.[38] Also, IS seems to be more centralised than Al Qaeda, and members – when referring to the Iraqi and Syrian battle zone - can be more easily recognised. This would arguably also mean that the leadership of IS should – in theory – be able to control its members and to make sure they abide to certain IHL rules, which would could turn them into an actor in a NIAC.

The second point of contention within IHL related to terrorism and the fight against terrorism are the alleged repercussions of calling a fight with and against a terrorist group an armed conflict. The US, for instance, has claimed that Al Qaeda members are "unlawful enemy combatants", who do not fall under the protection of the Geneva Conventions.[39] However, calling the War on Terror an IAC would be seen as a serious upgrade for the status of the terrorists. They would first of all be seen as legal combatants, and secondly, theoretically be entitled to a Prisoner of War-status upon capture. Also, the articles in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols outlaw most attacks on civilians, but do permit attacks on combatants. This latter point, in fact, could justify attacks by terrorist organizations on military targets.

TERRORISM, WAR CRIMES, ARMED CONFLICT

Inspired by a research paper from Leiden University

These reasons have motivated Michael Hoffmann to argue that there is a clear "misfit" between current IHL and the characteristics of today's terrorist groups.[40] It might be difficult to argue that these cases could qualify as a NIAC, but there is even more reluctance to call it an IAC.

As a result, it often remains rather vague and ambiguous how a certain fight against a terrorist organization qualifies under IHL. This legal ambiguity is recognized as a serious issue by many IHL scholars, as it is necessary that any fight against terrorist organizations is also clearly and transparently bounded by the rule of law.

In sum, IHL provides sufficient ground to prosecute terrorist attacks, regardless of who perpetrates the act. The most pressing questions with regard to IHL and terrorism seem to be as follows: should we qualify some of the military attempts to counter terrorism as armed conflict guided by IHL, and if so, are these international or non-international armed conflicts? If IHL is applicable, this might have legal repercussions for the terrorists, effectively upgrading their status.

Use this as a research checklist

USEFUL SOURCES

These are arranged in order of importance in an ideal scenario but this may differ from allotment to allotment

1. UNSC Verbatim - https://library.un.org/index-proceedings/security-council

2. Your country's foreign affairs website [eg- mid.ru for Russia or gov.uk for UK]

3. Papers and articles on terrorism in armed conflict - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316544124_Peace_terrorism_armed_conflict_and_war_crimes

4. Papers and articles on specific regions with respect to the agenda-

   eg-

   https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304615944_Terrorism_in_the_Arab-Israeli_Conflict

5. Reports from UN bodies and fact-finding missions

6. Important legal arguments in the region from legal framework or ICJ judgements [eg- the wall case in the Israel Palestine region which cleared up a lot of legal ambiguity in the region]

7. Reports from your state news agencies

8. Reports from internationally recognised news agencies like Reuters

9. Statements made by your country in international fora

10. Your own brain- use the information you have accumulated to form your own arguments, logic, and solutions